In connection with a talk on Banking Standards arranged by the Financial Times and given by Nick Gould, Chairman of SME Alliance (www.smealliance.org), he asked members to provide information of their own “real life“ experiences in dealing with certain banks. Here are the questions and answers. They will make extremely uncomfortable reading for the banks and bankers concerned
1. If you had a similar claim against a bank today, do you think you would be treated any differently, YES or NO—why have you replied as you have? Please keep it short
2. Would you say you have noticed any improvement in your treatment by the bank over the last few years, or is it the same , better or worse—please provide one or two short examples to back up your answer.
3. Would you say the people you have been dealing with have treated you with high ethical, professional and business standards —YES or NO—please provide one or two short example to back up your answer.
4. If you could wave a magic wand and improve one thing in the overall conduct of your bank in its dealings with you, what would that one thing be?
Quote re scheme
what Lloyds says in public and what it does in private already seems to be two very different things.
Moreover, the Bank’s decision to appoint Professor Russel Griggs as its ITP before completing its meetings with victims and without consulting with any of them or the APPG beforehand clearly does not bode well in this respect.
In particular, it would seem to us, based on his background as the current overseer of credit application appeals, that Lloyds has selected Professor Griggs to perform the role of the traditional, secondary, reviewer, who will review decisions that Lloyds has already made in individual cases, rather than that of a primary, truly independent, decision maker.
We also have concerns over Professor Griggs’ previous reluctance to criticise RBS before the Treasury Select Committee and his simplistic, unsympathetic, view that businesses within RBS’ GRG would have been unlikely to survive anyway given their financial difficulties, which completely ignored the fact that many businesses that fell into the clutches of the GRG did so for wholly spurious and baseless reasons.
Clearly, there is a risk Professor Griggs may already be predisposed towards the Bank’s likely position on issues of causation and “case-hardened” towards the victims of HBOS’ Impaired Assets division.